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T n FROM CLAMPDOWN TO LIMITED EMPOWERMENTCALIBRATION AND REGU ATIONFrom Clampdown to Limited Empowerment: 
Soft Law in the Calibration and Regulation of 
Religious Conduct in Singapore
 
EUGENE K. B. TAN
 
The focus of Singapore’s response to terrorism post 9/11 has been to reach out
to the “moderate, mainstream” Muslims as a bulwark against societal implosion.
This article examines the broad-based endeavor toward “religious moderation.”
While coercive draconian legislation remain the mainstay against extremists
and radicals, the mobilization of soft law, aspirational norms, and values are
consciously woven into the state’s endeavors to enhance society’s resilience and
cohesion. They also seek to regulate religious conduct at a time when the state
wishes to entrench secularism as a cornerstone of the governance of a multi-racial,
multireligious society. Rights and regulation are not antithetical to each other;
they are integral to the entire process of managing sociopolitical risks that
presents a real danger of an incivility spiral in which distrust, fear, and suspicion
conspire toward societal breakdown.
 
I. INTRODUCTION
 
As a viable, if not threatening, ideological counterweight to political and
secular ideologies, religion has been both a unifying and a divisive force
throughout the course of human history. In today’s interconnected world,
the transnational dimension has brought with it heightened concerns that
religion could undermine a government’s ability to protect a state’s security
and sovereignty. Hence, religion is still regarded with ambivalence, if not
suspicion, by many governments even in liberal democracies where politics
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and theology still commingle to varying degrees. The separation of state
and church (religion) is not preordained or a normal state of affairs.
As Lilla (2007) notes, “Religion has its roots in needs that are rational and
moral, even noble . . . Religion is simply too entwined with our moral experience
ever to be disentangled from it, and morality is inseparable from politics.”
Given the tendency to regard secular and religious loyalties as competing, many
governments acutely feel the imperative and the need to maintain vigilance.
Post 9/11, religion and national security are now even more intimately linked
(Bergin et al. 2007). Religion and state security are taken seriously in Singa-
pore although there has been no overt religious conﬂict since its hurried
independence in August 1965 (Hill 2003, 2004).
 
1
 
 In some respects, 9/11 and
its aftermath have driven home the message that “religious-inspired” threats
to national security are best dealt with not by indiscriminately clamping
down on religion. Even as national security comes under threat, the better
approach is to ensure that the citizens’ religious identities remain secure.
Such a paradoxical approach also entails that civil society play a bigger role
in ensuring that the state and religion are both secure. In short, looking at
religion merely as a security threat is manifestly inadequate in keeping both
state and society safe.
Although secularism is a cardinal principle of Singapore’s political
governance, the Singapore government is acutely aware that religion and
politics are not distinct spheres of inﬂuence and experience. It recognizes
that religions tend to encompass comprehensive world views on all dimensions
of human existence. Even as the state strives to keep religion and politics
distinct and separate, it is also pragmatically alive to the fact that maintain-
ing a watertight separation between these two realms is neither realistic nor
sustainable (Thio 2008). The local jurisprudence establishes secularism
as a legal norm encompassing two key principles: (1) the right to religious
freedom is not absolute and unqualiﬁed and has to be balanced against the
interests of the community and (2) the government has a central role in
ensuring that there is no exuberant expression of the right to religious freedom.
The chief justice observes that “Multiculturalism is a constitutionally
entrenched obligation. It is part of the fabric of Singapore as a nation from
the day it was born. We have to make it a success for our collective survival
as a sovereign state” (Chan 2007). Aware of the power of religion to mobilize,
motivate, and enforce behavior, values, and norms among the faithful, the
Singapore political leadership has even mobilized religion to facilitate
aspects of nation-building (Tan 2008).
More recently, the government has become more conscious and respon-
sive to civil society’s role in strengthening interfaith engagement and under-
standing, and the thickening of social fabric. In countering the terrorist
threat, the approach has evolved rapidly from a “whole-of-government” to
a “whole-of-society” approach, a signiﬁcant recognition of terrorism as
being “by far the most serious [security problem] that we have faced since
the communist problem” (
 
Today
 
 2006). This is a tacit acknowledgment
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that the security of the state, government, and society are all interlinked.
The terrorism threat requires not just a security response but a holistic one,
one that seeks to align the hearts and minds of the faith communities to the
societal objective of harmony and peace.
Institutional efforts to deal with the terrorism threat are in essence a col-
lective action challenge: How do societies prevent the terrorist ideology
from establishing and gaining traction within a community? What can
multicultural societies do to cope with the aftermath of a terrorist attack? How
can societies fortify themselves to come out resiliently against the forces
that seek to divide and destroy? In this article, I examine the approach
taken by the Singapore government in embedding key values and norms,
through law and policy, to mold and regulate behavior in the quest to nur-
ture social cohesion and resilience post 9/11. The philosophy underpinning
the legal and policy thrusts is encapsulated in the belief that religious
freedom intimately requires a calibrated intersection of rights and regula-
tion. Given the nature of the terrorism threat, this intersection of rights,
responsibilities, and regulation invariably expands the role of the state even
as it seeks to attend to the interests and concerns of the key stakeholders
(viz citizens, the Muslim community, and policymakers) with nuanced
sensitivity. Civil society can be meaningfully inducted to enhance a society’s
capacity to deal with the harm and to infuse legitimacy and conﬁdence in
the measures taken.
The article is organized as follows. Part II describes the Singaporean
context vis-à-vis the terrorism threat. It then discusses the role of hard and
soft laws in the overall institutional effort to deal with the terrorism threat.
Part III discusses the legislative arsenal that the government can deploy in
dealing with racial and religious threats to public order and harmony. It
also discusses the limitations of hard law in the counterterrorism efforts.
Part IV attempts a critical examination of two key soft law instruments, the
Declaration on Religious Harmony and the Singapore Muslim Identity
project, in fortifying the Singapore polity against the insidious effects of
religious extremism. Part V concludes.
 
II. FIGHTING TERROR: HARD AND SOFT LAWS
A. THE SINGAPORE CASE
 
In the last few years, religious extremism and violence is presented as the
severest security threat to Singapore since communism. In declaring itself
“an iconic target,” Singapore is gearing itself for the inevitability of a ter-
rorist attack on its soil (
 
Straits Times
 
 2004). In the aftermath of a terrorist
attack, especially by home-grown perpetrators, the policymakers’ primary
concern is the potential backlash against the minority Muslim community
and the unraveling of Singapore’s social fabric. Constitutionally recognized
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as the indigenous people of Singapore, 99.6 percent of Malays are Muslims.
The racial (Malay) and religious (Muslim) identities are often conﬂated
and coterminous in ofﬁcial discourse, resulting in a top-down enforced
reduction of individual and subgroup differences within the Malay-Muslim
community, and the convenient tendency to treat it as a monolithic entity.
In turn, this double-bond of race and faith inevitably nurtures stronger
Malay-Muslim community self-consciousness.
While it is misleading to equate the increased religiosity of the Muslim-
Singaporean community as sympathy with or support for the violent strand
of Islamism, the government has always been concerned that primordial
loyalties of faith and ethnicity would take precedence over civic and secular
loyalties to the Singapore nation-state. In particular, the government’s concern
with the perceived, growing exclusivity of the Malay-Muslim community
was ampliﬁed with the discovery of home-grown Islamist terrorist suspects
post-9/11 (Ministry of Home Affairs 2003). This latent fear of Muslims as
a Trojan horse has been heightened post-9/11, in tandem with Islamist terrorism
being regularly assessed as a real, multifaceted, and strategic threat in
Singapore’s locale of Southeast Asia (e.g., Chalk and Ungerer 2008; Jones
2008). This is further accentuated by the Beltway’s concerns over terrorism
in archipelagic Southeast Asia as the “second front” in the “global war against
terror” (
 
cf.
 
 Gershman 2002).
Since the end of 2001, Islam has come under very close scrutiny globally.
In Singapore, there were several rounds of arrests and detention of 
 
Jemaah
Islamiyah
 
 (JI) and “self-radicalized” terrorist suspects in Singapore. These
arrests of “home-grown” terrorist suspects had unsettled the Singapore
polity, with anecdotal evidence suggesting that ethnic relations were strained,
if not shrouded in suspicion in the initial crackdown between 2001 and
2004. The Malay-Muslims were themselves confronted by self-doubt and
ambivalence. The backdrop of the government’s apprehensions over the
loyalty of Muslim-Singaporeans to Singapore is a long-standing issue that
gnaws at the relationship between the community and the government.
This legacy of a lack of mutual trust accounts for the hypersensitivity that
surrounded the arrests. At the same time, the 
 
tudung
 
 (headscarf) contro-
versy of 2002 unfolded and added to the strained political atmosphere. The
issue at stake was whether Muslim prepubescent female students should be
permitted to wear the 
 
tudung
 
 in national primary schools. The students
were suspended from school as their parents insisted on their daughters
wearing the 
 
tudung
 
 in school.
 
2
 
 In 2002, 122 Muslim organizations came
together, as “a matter of conscience and national concern” and publicly
condemned terrorism as being at odds with Islam.
 
3
 
The government had expressed its fears of the Muslim community’s
perceived exclusion and self-segregation from Singaporean society on
religious grounds. Unfortunately, this was accompanied by unrelenting and
uninformed public scrutiny over the tenability of Islamic practices and
increased religiosity in Singapore. There were concerns and questions over
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the overt symbols and signs of Muslim identity and beliefs, which hitherto
did not arouse concern. This led the minister in charge of Muslim affairs
to remark that, “Observing religious practices became a shorthand for
hovering at the edge of terrorism” (Yaacob 2003). Before the launch of the
Community Engagement Program in February 2006, the public discourse of
the terrorist threat was inﬂected with a moral panic which linked increased
Islamic religiosity and perceived Malay-Muslim separateness with increased
susceptibility toward terrorism. These developments demonstrated that
sole reliance on coercive legislation to deal with the terrorism threat was
woefully inadequate.
 
B. RIGHTS AND REGULATION: ROLE OF HARD AND SOFT LAWS
 
In the area of governance and regulation, particularly in the realm of public
international law, the use of hard law and, increasingly, soft law are the
two main modes by which legalization has taken place. Hard law is generally
understood as “legally binding obligations that are precise (or can be made
precise through adjudication or the issuance of detailed regulations) and
that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law” (Abbott
and Snidal 2001: 37). Domestic legislation and international treaties are the
tangible expressions of hard law. For example, antiterrorism legislations
stipulate—in varying degrees of clarity and precision—the proscribed acts
of commission and omission (obligations and compliance), the imposition
of legally binding duties and obligations (accountability), and the punishment
for transgression (sanctions). The coercive powers of hard law are useful in
clamping down real and present dangers. However, they also impose severe
costs and unintended consequences.
 
4
 
 Given the nature of the terrorist threat
as both existential and ideational, the structural power of hard law is often not
only reactionary, but also grossly inadequate as a means of preemptive, adaptive
socialization and social learning prior to, during, and after a terrorism strike.
On the other hand, soft law is less deﬁnitive and does not create enforceable
rights and duties. It includes a variety of processes that attempt to set rules,
guidelines, or codes of conduct that share the common trait of having non-
legally binding normative content that may have regulative, practical effects
similar to hard law. As soft law cannot be enforced by legal means, it can-
not be relied upon as a basis for deterrence, enforcement action, and puni-
tive sanctions. However, soft law is ﬂexible and has discursive power
through its facilitative effort to set normative standards and enable social
learning. This is particularly useful in situations of ﬂux where persuasion
and reﬂexive adjustment, rather than rigid adherence or enforcement, are
needed. Soft law also has the beneﬁt of being facilitative of efforts to
internalize the norms embedded in hard law (see also Trubeck et al. 2006).
For instance, the ideational standards or expectations ﬁrst enunciated in
soft law mechanisms can subsequently form the basis on which the practical
application of the hard law can acquire effectiveness, efﬁcacy, and legitimacy.
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Soft law can also be understood as law in the embryonic stage of forma-
tion (precursor of emerging hard law) or as principles and norms that might
eventually consolidate and contribute to the legal interpretation of hard law
or become legally binding rules themselves. In this regard, soft law can help
knowledge, norms, and values to be framed strategically and dovetail with
existing normative frameworks. As such, soft law’s strategic potential is its
“soft power.” Rather than resorting to threats (in essence, the use of hard law)
or payments (bribes), soft power is the ability of a political entity to obtain
what it wants by virtue of being an attractive model (Nye 2004). Speciﬁcally,
soft law mechanisms in dealing with the terrorism threat can be adapted for
the purposes of winning the “hearts and minds” of people by persuading
the relevant stakeholders that violence and conﬂict are not the solutions. In
Singapore’s context, this means the government can use soft law to attract,
socialize, and co-opt the citizenry, especially the minority Malay-Muslim
community, on the imperative of ensuring that religion is not abused to sow
discord, conﬂict, and violence. These attributes of soft law may facilitate
the socialization, the formation of consensual knowledge, and a shared
understanding of the terrorist threat and the desired conduct to counter it.
Furthermore, soft law can also possess the regulative and constraining
effect of hard law. The utility of soft law instruments is its transformative
capacity in socializing stakeholders through a consensual and conﬁdence-
building process. More directly, soft law speaks to reason, understanding,
strives to develop consensus, and encourage the internalization of desired
values and interests. Lawrence Kohlberg’s (1976) three levels of moral
development help demonstrate how soft law’s iterative, quasi-prescriptive
nature can engage cognitive and informed responses in developing a nuanced
regulative response to a societal threat (see Figure 1).
Hard law approaches tend to elicit reasoning and responses that are
primarily egocentric, denominated in self-centered terms of avoiding punishment,
compliance with an authority, and group norms (levels one or two of Kohl-
berg’s moral development). Soft law approaches encourage the movement
toward a level-three moral development in which a person is able to adopt
a perspective that factors the interests of affected parties based on impartial
and reasonable principles. When successfully imbibed, soft law approaches
result in society being able to attain the postconventional stage of moral
reasoning in which critical and reﬂective reasoning are dominant. It is likely
that the authorities now believe that exercising moral suasion over the
expected and desired conduct of Singaporeans before, during, and after a
terrorist attack is a better means of ensuring that society does not implode.
Although we should not view hard and soft law in binary or antithetical
terms in dealing with the terrorism threat, it is crucial nonetheless to distin-
guish between (1) laws that seek to prevent terrorist acts from taking place
and (2) laws that seek to prevent a multiracial society from imploding after
a terrorist attack. The objectives of law and policy differ for both courses
of action even though both are interdependent and highlight the ideal of
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society as a cooperative effort.
 
5
 
 For laws that seek to prevent terrorist acts
from taking place, a hard law approach focusing on deterrence and
sanctions would cohere with the preventative and command-and-control
objectives targeted at a recalcitrant few. For laws that seek to prevent a
multiracial society from imploding after a terrorist attack, it becomes
imperative to emphasize a cooperative values-based culture and norms to
engender ethical conduct of the masses, grounded in self-regulation, civic
responsibility, and social resilience.
In Singapore, hard and soft laws are often used to complement each
other to enlarge the state’s capacity to regulate as well as socialize the citi-
zenry. The use of centralized administrative mechanisms besides the law is
another feature of regulation in an authoritarian city-state. In the Singa-
pore case study presented in this article, the putative cooperative element of
the soft law approach is prominent as a societal hedge against generalized
mistrust and moral panic. This discussion is not an attempt to deﬁne the
perimeters of hard and soft law. Rather, it seeks in broad brush strokes, to
highlight the intrinsic commonalities and differences of both approaches to
prevailing issues of regulation and governance today (see further Goldstein
et al. 2001).
Figure 1. Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development.
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III. FIGHTING TERROR AND DISHARMONY
A. RIGHTS, PRAGMATISM, AND PREEMPTIVE LEGISLATION
 
Terrorism is an asymmetric threat requiring a multifaceted response that is
cognizant of the societal complexities inherent in multicultural polities. The
tendency to manage the terrorist threat through a harsh regulatory regime
often promotes executive power and relegates rights to a secondary role.
Too often, this results in a drastic reshaping of the law in which civil liberties
are given short shrift, undermining the very basis of legitimacy that these laws
need. Yet such regulation can be more effective if rights are recognized and
respected because they clothe the legal and political processes at work with
authority, legality, and legitimacy. Of course, a rights-only framework is
manifestly inadequate against terrorists who do not operate under such rules
and have a wanton disregard for the rights, safety, and liberty of others.
While rights underpin the foundation of modern democracies, a key chal-
lenge posed by terrorism is to balance rights with responsibilities, as well as fear
and insecurity against liberty and security, within a regulatory framework.
On the other hand, the rights and responsibilities of the various stake-
holders, if properly honored and executed, can contribute to efﬁcient and
effective governance. Such responsibilities contribute to the overall account-
ability and collective effort to maintain and enhance society’s well-being.
Thus, rights and regulation are not antithetical to each other. They are inte-
gral to the entire process of managing sociopolitical risks that presents a
real danger of an incivility spiral where distrust, fear, and suspicion con-
spire toward societal breakdown.
Although Singapore is ostensibly a secular state, religion is co-opted
instrumentally by the state (e.g., Thio 2006; Tan 2008). For much of its
independence, even as the one-party dominant state sought to reap the
utility of religion, it has also largely regarded religion with wariness. Mindful
that a muscular, knuckle-duster response in faith matters can do more harm
than good, the government has endeavored to have at its disposal as wide a
range of regulatory and enforcement options as possible. With these powers,
the government can respond sensitively to threats originating in the reli-
gious realm by utilizing the most appropriate legislation vis-à-vis the threat
posed. This, of course, is fraught with signiﬁcant challenges given that the realms
of the secular and the sacred cannot always be demarcated with precision.
Singapore’s overall approach to terrorism and religious extremism is
premised on racial and religious harmony as the “fundamental basis for our
social stability, cohesion and security” (Jayakumar 2007). The legislative
and political intent is to manage, and regulate if necessary, the extent to
which religion can exert its inﬂuence in the political realm. While law has a
prominent role in counterterrorism efforts, Singapore’s actions are driven
by pragmatic considerations of what works rather than a rigid ideological
commitment to the rule of law.
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The rule of law hinges upon laws that work. But its continued relevance
depends upon more than the law. The government must be able to enforce it;
and must work with the citizenry to assiduously nurture the culture and values
that support it. The courts must be able to uphold it. The citizenry must respect
it. Ultimately it is undergirded by a society’s perspective of its desired values,
propagated by a preponderance of those values, and relevant only when its
framework results in wellbeing for all. (Jayakumar 2007)
 
Given the overriding concern with security and the fear of religion as a
potent source of conﬂict, there are several key legislations that provide a
variety of options as part of the enforcement arsenal in dealing with indi-
viduals and groups in the religious realm that pose a public order threat.
There is strong judicial support for the government’s preemptive approach
in national security matters:
 
[The] submission that it must be shown that there was a clear and immediate
danger was misplaced for one simple reason. It cannot be said that beliefs,
especially those propagated in the name of “religion”, should not be put to a
stop until such a scenario exists. If not, it would in all probability be too late
as the damage sought to be prevented would have transpired. . . . [A]ny admin-
istration which perceives the possibility of trouble over religious beliefs and yet
prefers to wait until trouble is just about to break out before taking action
must be not only pathetically naïve but also grossly incompetent.
 
6
 
Believing fervently that problems ought to be nipped in the bud, a
preemptive approach is seen in the Societies Act (Cap. 311). Notwithstanding
the constitutional protection of the freedom of association, a society that
represents, promotes, or discusses religious matters is a “speciﬁed society”
and has to be registered under the Societies Act. An unregistered society is
deemed to be an unlawful society. This registration requirement provides a
powerful mechanism by which the state can proscribe religious groups that
are deemed to be “prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good order in
Singapore” at any time.
 
7
 
 As the then chief justice noted, “the basis for the
de-registration clearly ﬂowed from the danger of allowing absolute freedom of
religion which might create a complete denial of a government’s authority
and ability to govern individuals or groups asserting a religious afﬁliation.”
 
8
 
At the other end of the spectrum, when draconian measures are needed,
the Internal Security Department can invoke the Internal Security Act
(ISA) (Cap. 143; 
 
Straits Times
 
 2007; Mendelsohn 2007).
 
9
 
 The ISA allows
for preventive detention, renewable for unlimited two-year periods, of any
person acting in a manner prejudicial to the Singapore’s security and the
maintenance of public order or essential services. Under the ISA, the courts
can only review such detentions on procedural grounds only. Over the last
four decades, the ISA has been applied to persons deemed to be communists
or involved in espionage, to agitators of racial and religious discord. Since
9/11, the ISA has been primarily used to arrest and detain suspected terrorists,
most of whom are members of the 
 
Jemaah Islamiyah
 
 (JI), an apparent al-Qaeda
offshoot (Ministry of Home Affairs 2003).
 
10
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If less draconian measures are needed, the government can use the criminal
justice system (Chan 2000). Chapter 15 of the Penal Code (Cap. 224), the
main criminal code, deals with offenses such as injuring or deﬁling a place
of worship, disturbing a religious assembly, uttering words or sounds to
deliberately wound religious or racial feelings. The Penal Code was recently
amended to provide for enhanced penalties for religiously aggravated offenses.
It also created a new offense of promoting enmity between different groups
on grounds of religion or race and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of
harmony. These amendments were in response to the changed environment
since 9/11, where the threat of conﬂict and violence arising from religion
and/or race is treated with even more seriousness.
Under the Sedition Act (Cap. 290), another relic from the communist
insurgency era, “seditious tendency” is widely interpreted. It includes,
 
inter alia
 
, raising discontent or disaffection among the citizens and residents
of Singapore and promoting feelings of ill-will and hostility between different
races or classes in Singapore. In 2005, three bloggers were charged and
convicted under the Sedition Act for posting Web-log comments that were
vehemently anti-Muslim.
 
11
 
 Although the use of the Sedition Act in these
blogging cases strike some as unduly harsh, the deliberateness in the
prosecutorial approach was likely to be motivated by the imperative to send
a strong signal to the large blogging community in Singapore to steadfastly
observe the basic ground rules when using the Internet. It also underlined
the government’s determination not to allow the Malay-Muslim community
to be made a scapegoat for the global security concerns.
Finally, the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA) (Cap. 167A),
enacted in 1990, seeks to maintain religious moderation and tolerance and
to keep religion and politics separate by legislating against conduct deemed
harmful to the virtue of religious tolerance and harmony, and the remedial
action in restraining the prohibited conduct. In addition, the MRHA
establishes the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony, an advisory
body of lay and religious leaders. The legislation was prompted primarily
by concerns in the 1980s of overzealous evangelical Christian proselytization
among Muslims and the mixing of religion with politics by some groups.
The MRHA empowers the issuance of restraining orders (ROs) to rein in
religious leaders who may use the pulpit and their authority to incite
religious discord. The MRHA is a preemptive legislation, which is less
draconian than the ISA or Sedition Act, and that seeks to circumspectly
deal with concerns of public order, away from the glare of open court pro-
ceedings that can inﬂame religious passion further (
 
Straits Times
 
 2001). So
far, no ROs have been issued since the enactment of the MRHA.
 
12
 
B. LIMITATIONS OF HARD LAW
 
Hard laws, in particular the ISA, can profoundly affect the delicate equilib-
rium between regulation, rights, and responsibilities. By downplaying the
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full consideration of rights in a clamp-down mode, draconian legislation
can immobilize the social actors and forces that help play a critical role in
generating and sustaining the lived social bonds to countervail the cleavages
that pull society apart. Historians Bayly and Harper (2007: 551) note how
the ISA’s predecessor with its powers of detention without trial, not only
obliterated communism but “a panoply of other alternatives” in the civil
society arena. Despite the government’s preparedness to use the various
enforcement options afforded to it, the long-standing terrorism threat has
given grounds for serious reconsideration of the effectiveness of such hard
law measures. Legislation alone cannot deal with all aspects of religious
radicalism, bigotry, and nihilism. This is particularly so when the battle is
not about law enforcement but one that is fundamentally concerned with
winning the hearts and minds of believers.
In the immediate aftermath of the initial rounds of JI arrests, the
government had adopted a privatized approach to what is essentially
a mutual existential threat. The collective security approach, which
hitherto had laid the substratum for stable ethnic relations in Singapore,
was sidelined. Instead, the Malay-Muslim community was expected to
shoulder the brunt of the concern and responsibility. It was, to all
intents and purposes, held solely responsible for the radicalization of a
small minority of Muslims and for any terrorist act and its subsequent
fallout. Although the government intended to rally the Muslim community
into action, this privatized approach can have the unintended effect of
isolating the mainstream Muslim community, thereby threatening mutual
security and undermining ethnic relations.
However, the government soon realized that such a privatized, ﬁnger-
pointing approach would neither help to isolate the terrorists nor ensure
that the terrorist ideology did not acquire wider support. Given the
nature of the terrorist threat and its dependence on a sympathetic con-
stituency to draw support and recruits to the cause, the nondiscriminat-
ing, clamping down strategy more often than not marginalizes, if not
alienates, the very bedrock of the Muslim community that is depended
upon to form the bulwark against creeping radicalization. Furthermore,
given that people rather than governments defeat terrorism, policymak-
ers have to fortify and prepare society by having all communities work
together in ensuring that society does not unravel in the aftermath of a
terrorist strike through mutual suspicion and distrust. Hence, the priva-
tized approach gave way to a community-wide or a “whole-of-society”
approach.
Isolating the terrorists, both politically and on religious grounds, is the
dominant approach now. Consequently, the overwhelming hard law emphasis
has conceded space for a soft law approach, recognizing that the terrorism
threat needs a collective and holistic response from governments and
societies alike. The previous, narrow framing of terrorism as being a
“Malay-Muslim problem” was abandoned. Terrorism is now being framed
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as a “national problem,” requiring a solution in which all Singaporeans,
regardless of their racial and religious allegiance, have a role to play (Lee
2006). The prime minister issued this timely corrective when he launched
the Community Engagement Program (CEP), the centerpiece of Singapore’s
social cohesion and counterterrorism endeavors:
 
[W]e must know that this is not a Malay-Muslim problem. This is a national
problem and non-Muslims also have to play your part, for example, by pre-
serving the space for minorities in the majority-Chinese society by upholding
the ideals of meritocracy and equal opportunity and treatment, regardless of
race, language and religion and by clearly distinguishing the small number of
extremists who are a threat to us from the majority of moderate, rational, loyal
Muslim Singaporeans with whom we work together to tackle a shared prob-
lem. And this way, we can build conﬁdence and trust between the different
communities and the best time to do that is now when we don’t have a crisis.
This is because building trust takes time. (Lee 2006)
 
The CEP aims to mobilize Muslim and non-Muslim communities to
work together in tackling the terrorist threat.
 
13
 
 In this regard, the toler-
ance mode, manifested in the oft-mentioned “live and let live” dictum, is
inadequate. While draconian legislation may be apt in the event of a
crisis, it does not assist in the building of interethnic ties during peaceful
conditions. Nor does it help society to get back on its feet in the after-
math of a terrorist attack. Enforcing draconian legislation is reactionary
with little didactic and normative value. To be sure, the Singapore
government believes in the utility and necessity of coercive legislation.
It also continues to insist that the Muslim community practices its faith
in the context of a multiracial society with moderation as the deﬁning
attribute. But the government is also convinced that legislation alone is
insufﬁcient to keep the deleterious effects of radicalism and social con-
sequences of a terrorist attack at bay. Singapore’s foreign minister put
it aptly: “There is a limit to what laws can do. We can legislate against
extremism but we can’t legislate harmony” (Yeo 2006). It is indeed highly
questionable if governments can indeed outlaw extremism.
The trouble with the primacy of a hard law approach is that it abrogates
to the state and policymakers the power to control and deﬁne the “prob-
lem.” It obfuscates the reality and the urgency of building ties between a
devout Muslim minority and a non-Muslim majority within a political
structure that sanctions secular political governance. Hard law also denies
the sociopolitical and religious dimensions present in terrorism. Ironically,
hard law can secure the state, but its overemphatic use ultimately impover-
ishes the very security of the state and society. With soft law, a collabora-
tive mechanism of norms, institutions, and structures can buttress the
framework to sustain religious harmony. The rest of the article discusses the
Declaration on Religious Harmony, and the Singapore Muslim Identity
project, as putative indicators of the soft law approach in which the need
and value of bottom-up conﬁdence building are emphasized.
 Tan CALIBRATION AND REGULATION
 
363
 
© 2009 The Author
Journal compilation © 2009 Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy
 
IV. SOFT LAW AGAINST TERRORISM
A. NORMING RELIGIOUS HARMONY
 
Soft law approaches can accommodate the utility of public debate, bottom-up
conﬁdence-building, and intrinsic goodwill in countering the terrorist ideology.
The ﬁrst step taken was in the Declaration on Religious Harmony (DRH),
a nonlegislative, nonenforceable document (Thio 2004). Unveiled in June 2003
and available in four ofﬁcial languages, this was a government-led initiative
to educate and engage civil society on the acceptable norms in the practice of
one’s faith. It also outlines the perimeters of religious conduct that is deemed
moderate and nonthreatening. By having the religious elites craft and endorse
the DRH as a code of conduct for religious harmony, the government hopes
that the boundaries of acceptable religious conduct would gain wider acceptance
and buy-in. Rather than a diktat from an overbearing, security-conscious
state, the DRH is an attempt to exert moral suasion on the religious leaders
and their followers alike to practice their faith fully sensitive to the multi-
religious realities and secular imperatives within the Singapore polity.
The DRH represents a ﬂedgling attempt at concretizing the guiding
principles from which consensus-building and norm-building can evolve
(see Figure 2). On closer scrutiny, the DRH’s prescription of some “dos” also
lays out the ground rules that have sustained multireligiosity as a virtue rather
than a vice. In the preamble, it reiterates religious harmony as a 
 
sine qua non
 
for peace, progress, and prosperity. It underscores the need for “mutual tolerance,
conﬁdence, respect and understanding.” The prescriptive part of the DRH
emphasizes the long-standing secular state, the need to promote cohesion,
the respect for freedom of religion (a fundamental liberty), and the importance
of interreligious communication. The most substantive prescription is the
call to grow the “common space,” a term that only entered into Singapore’s
ethnic relations lexicon in 1999. The fear of home-grown terrorism unraveling
Singapore society galvanized the government’s commitment to enhance
interactions between the different communities by enlarging the overlapping
common area (common space) as a preemptive and absorptive measure.
The drafting process of the DRH is also insightful. Originally the “Code
of Religious Harmony,” the government provided the ﬁrst draft of the
DRH. Led by a junior minister and a committee of parliamentarians of
various faiths, the various national bodies of all major religious groups in
Singapore were consulted on the draft. The discussion was initially
conducted with the religious bodies individually. Inputs from the public
were received through letters, e-mails, and the media. Subsequently, a revised
draft was prepared, and representatives of all the religious bodies reviewed
the draft as a group. The draft was then submitted to the Inter-Racial
Conﬁdence Circle National Steering Committee, before ﬁnal submission to
the government in February 2003. Mindful of the sensitivities, the DRH
working committee consulted all major religious groups in Singapore.
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Prior to the DRH, the principles of responsible religious conduct were
not made explicit. In the late 1980s, the government had decided against
a similar guidelines approach as it felt that it would be ineffective against
a minority who would disregard a list of “do’s” and “don’ts.” Instead, it
preferred a hard law approach and proceeded to enact the MRHA. In
contrast, the DRH lays out the principles in general terms without being
unduly prescriptive. Indeed, one could argue that the DRH could do with
more “do’s” and “don’ts.” However, bearing in mind the purpose of the
soft law approach, the avoidance of formalistic rules in preference for
overarching principles and guidelines is a more enlightened approach and
more reassuring. In comparing the draft and ﬁnal versions of the DRH, one
can discern the different views and the nuanced contestation between the
Figure 2. Comparison of the Draft and Final Version of the DRH.
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government and the religious elites on the appropriate religious conduct.
This implicit contestation should not, however, be overstated. Given that
interracial and interreligious relations have been on an even keel since inde-
pendence, there was a healthy measure of mutual trust and conﬁdence
between the government and the religious elites.
Three points are worth mentioning in the context of the divergent views
on the draft. The ﬁrst is the religious elites’ reluctance to describe Singapore
as a “secular society.” The preference was to describe “the secular nature”
of the Singapore state.
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 This distinction is important in that it brokers and
acknowledges a role for religion in Singapore society even as secularism is a
core governance philosophy assiduously subscribed to by the government.
Secondly, the ﬁnal version removed “integration” from the draft. Integra-
tion is subjected to varying interpretations, including assimilation into the
majority culture. The minority faiths were also articulating their concern
with having to integrate into the majority faith (Buddhism and Taoism) or
the faiths commonly embraced by the ethnic Chinese majority (especially
Buddhism, Christianity, and Taoism). Finally, the draft spoke of practicing
religion in a manner that “expands the common space of Singaporeans.”
This was amended to “grow our common space while respecting our
diversity.” The use of “expansion” was perceived to entail a concomitant
reduction in the private spaces for the religious groups. The ﬁnal version
addressed this concern by replacing “expands” with “grow” in which the
latter verb does not connote a zero-sum situation vis-à-vis the growth of the
common space.
The drafting process had the salutary effect of assuring the various faith
communities of their role and presence in Singapore society. To its credit,
the government accommodated the amendments and ensured that the DRH
was not a pseudo-executive ﬁat. Following the adoption of the DRH, the
Interreligious Harmony Circle, consisting of representatives of all major
faiths involved in the DRH consultation process, was formally established
to build on the interfaith dialoguing established in the earlier consultations
and discussions. The retention of this grouping of religious elites as a
consultation forum to guide efforts to promote the spirit of the DRH
underlines the belief that the DRH needs to be a living document in which
the norms and values are practiced in form and substance. The government
has also urged religious bodies and schools to recite the DRH annually on
Racial Harmony Day (21 July).
 
B. FORGING A DISTINCTIVE MUSLIM-SINGAPOREAN IDENTITY
 
The slew of initiatives post-9/11 to protect the Singaporean homeland
against terrorism demonstrates Singapore’s resolve to confront the threat
(NSCS 2004, 2006). The urgent and renewed push toward the forging of
national resilience in the new security environment entails that the govern-
ment engage civil society as a partner. In the battle of ideas and for the
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hearts and minds of believers, it is civil society that can facilitate the
overlapping consensus on the nature and content of the religious conduct in
a secular, multiracial society. In particular, the centrality of civil society
reiterates the fact that the state cannot unilaterally impose its view on
a faith community’s desired practices. Instead, it highlights the patent need
for and commitment to dialogue, cooperation, and trust. The various
efforts in engaging civil society, particularly the Muslim community, stem
from the overarching themes of promoting moderation and a distinctive
Muslim-Singaporean identity as a bulwark against religious-inspired
terrorism. This concerted effort toward engaging the Muslim community,
albeit through the Islamic Religious Council (MUIS) as the dominant
interlocutor, privileges the promotion of an autochthonous practice of
Islam.
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 Emphasis is placed on religious moderation, a sensitive recognition
of Singapore’s multiracialism, and the need for the Muslim private space
not to encroach onto or reduce the common space. The promotion of
“Islamic moderation” and interreligious understanding is buttressed by the
central concerns of social cohesion and religious tolerance.
Following the JI arrests, the initial characterization of the terrorist threat
facing Muslim-Singaporeans was one of “radical versus moderate” Islam,
and the imperative of the “moderate path.”
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 Moderation is understood to
mean that Muslims ought not interpret and practice Islam narrowly and
rigidly. It also requires Muslims to speak up against coreligionists who
advocate intolerance and extremism to ensure that these views do not gain
legitimacy and currency by default as a consequence of the silence of the
moderate majority. Mindful that the fate of terrorist ideology lies with the
Muslim community, the Singapore government, through MUIS, advocates
the need for a “moderate, mainstream Muslim” community. The government’s
clarion call is for Muslim-Singaporeans to inoculate themselves and their
community against radical ideologies while undermining the theological
legitimacy of the terrorists’ beliefs and actions.
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 Although the public
discourse retains the self-limiting and unenlightening trope of “moderate
versus radical Islam,” a parallel focus is on a broad-based, community
approach in advancing interreligious tolerance, understanding, and conﬁdence.
This unrelenting emphasis on moderation is intimately connected with
the urgency to mold the Muslim-Singaporean identity as one that is not
only congruent with the Islamic values but also in sync with progressive
attributes of Singaporean society. In MUIS’s 16 February 2007 sermon,
moderation was explained in the following manner
 
19
 
:
 
We must understand and internalize these two principles [
 
Ath-Thawabit
 
, or
those that are ﬁxed and unchangeable forever, and 
 
Al-Mutaghaiyirat
 
, or those
that can be changed and suited for different times and place]. Only by under-
standing it can we avoid from being extremists who interpret Islam from a very
narrow viewpoint. And by understanding them, we can also avoid from (sic)
slipping into the path of liberal interpretation of Islam. This is the moderation
that Islam wants. Make this moderation our way of life. Make this moderation
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as an identity for our community. Because only on this moderation will our
community be an example to others, a community of just and be (sic) a witness
to others. (MUIS—Islamic Religious Council of Singapore 2007)
 
To this end, the MUIS actively promotes the “Singapore Muslim Identity”
(SMI). MUIS embarked on the SMI project in early 2005 to impress upon
Muslim-Singaporeans of the need for an autochthonous Muslim-Singaporean
identity and way of life. Such a “religiously profound” and “socially
progressive” identity is contextualized to the prevailing sociopolitical and
economic environment. This is now embodied in the “Ten Desired Attributes”
of Singapore’s “Muslim Community of Excellence” (see Figure 3). These
attributes ostensibly seek to help Muslim-Singaporeans understand and
excel in their dual roles and identities as Muslims and citizens.
The SMI draws a distinction between a Muslim’s religious duties and
sociopolitical obligations, and proposes that the ideal Muslim posture as
one that does not require trade-offs or sacriﬁce of the core religious iden-
tity. The key SMI themes are: Adaptability (attribute #1, #3, #7), religios-
ity (#1, #2, #6), modernity (#2, #3, #7), knowledgeable and open-
mindedness (#4, #5), compatibility of religious and national identities (#6,
#8, #9), and exemplary and active citizenry (#7, #10). The SMI is as much
an afﬁrmation of the Muslim-Singaporean loyalty to Singapore even as the
community seeks to assert its own sense of its values and ideals. The Muslim
affairs minister elaborates that the SMI “does not mean that the state must
accept everything that we believe nor it is expected that everything that
happens in Singapore is accepted by us. . . . Where there is an apparent conﬂict
of values and ideals, we seek to promote understanding and respect each
other’s position. We share our values but do not impose our values on others”
(Yaacob 2005). Mindful that the forging of unique Singaporean Muslim identity
is not an academic exercise but an ongoing process that needs to gain traction
with the Muslim ground, MUIS initiated a series of dialogues and discussions
to explain and gather feedback. The consultation process included the pro-
duction of a key document, 
 
Risalah Membangun Masyarakat
 
, to articulate
the ten desired attributes of the Singapore Muslim community of excellence.
In addition, MUIS’s weekly Friday sermons (
 
khutbah
 
) also regularly discuss
the SMI as part of the dissemination and education process.
Through the SMI, MUIS promotes the practice of Islam in Singapore as
one that is cognizant of the religious pluralism within the context of a secular
state. By concretizing the virtues and aspirational norms of a Muslim-
Singaporean, the SMI is an endeavor to craft a desired Islamic-Singaporean
identity that will not be overwhelmed by the appeals of competing and
disparate Muslim ideas and identities imported from overseas, notwith-
standing Islam’s Arabic roots and continuing inﬂuence. The nuanced
message is that Muslims are not being forced into a false choice between
being Muslims and Singaporeans. This conscious ampliﬁcation of a unique
Singaporean-Muslim identity urges the recognition that there is no funda-
mental compatibility of Singaporean and Muslim identities.
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Even then, the promotion of the SMI has to be balanced against the
government’s effort to grow the common space, an initiative that predates
9/11. At that time, the government noted that growing Muslim religiosity
could pose problems if it resulted in its segregation and exclusion from the
larger society. The SMI seeks to preempt the inevitable contestation and
doubts within the Muslim community over national identity and religious
identity by asserting that both identities are complementary and not mutually
exclusive. Such exhortatory efforts are to be welcomed although the
messaging needs to be extended to the non-Muslim community. For the true
demonstration that Muslim-Singaporeans can be conﬁdent of their place in
Singaporean society is to ensure that discrimination on grounds of race or
religion, however subtle, is not tolerated. So long as the vestiges of suspicion
of the Malay-Muslim community persist, the pathways toward inclusion,
cohesion, and resilience will be problematic and contested.
 
C. SCRUTINIZING THE DRH AND SMI: EMPOWERMENT, 
MARGINALIZATION, AND NORM-SETTING
 
There is now ofﬁcial recognition that maintaining social cohesion and resil-
ience requires a two-way process at various levels: between state and civil
Figure 3. Ten Desired Attributes of Singapore’s Muslim Community of Excellence 
(with Respect to Socio-Religious Life).
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society, between political and religious elites, between religious elites and their
followers, between elites and followers of the various faiths. The DRH and
the SMI demonstrate the authorities’ recognition for Muslims and non-Muslims
to be collectively responsible and committed toward enhancing social cohesion.
More speciﬁcally, the DRH and SMI seek to bolster intercommunal resilience
and reduce the likelihood of unconsidered sectarian responses when society
is in crisis mode. The SMI also serves to reinforce intracommunal resili-
ence and consensus on their hyphenated citizenship. Acting in tandem, the
DRH and SMI induct the actors within and without the religious sphere
into a sociopolitical context and normative framework in which they are
shaped by the dominant discourse of moderation, cooperation, and harmony.
 
1.
 
Devolving Regulation, Risk Management, and the Harmony Imperative
 
The soft law approach pivots on the centrality of developing commitment
to common values and ideals that all communities can identify with and use
to guide their daily activities and interactions. The intent of the DRH and
SMI is to crystallize the principles for the practice of religious harmony as
sociopolitical norms and so strengthen the secular and multireligious
character of Singapore. Taken together, they are helpful correctives to the
hegemonic role of the government in conﬁdence-building. Notwithstanding
that the government continues to assert itself as an indispensable intermediary
in facilitating better interracial and interreligious understanding, the
top-down nature of the soft law approaches should not detract from the
value that these codes provide as a useful starting point for the various
faith communities to self-regulate and engage each other meaningfully. These
soft law instruments devolve, in a limited way, risk management to the popu-
lation at large (viz DRH) and the Muslim community (viz SMI). The govern-
ment hopes that the message of tolerance, understanding, and respect
would “permeate the grassroots so that it becomes part and parcel of the
values of Singaporeans” (Wong 2007). Although the government does not
provide direct funding for the activities by various groups under the aus-
pices of the DRH and SMI, various government and quasi-government
agencies do have regular budgetary allocations for activities that promote
interracial and religious understanding. MUIS, 
 
OnePeople.sg
 
, and the
Community Development Councils are especially active in promoting such
interaction. As such, the objectives of the DRH and SMI are further supported.
By inducting one key segment of civil society (viz the religious elites) in
the drafting exercise, the process facilitated the vital generation of legitimacy,
consensus and buy-in on the ground rules. Given the subtle competition
among religions for believers, this cooperative effort is signiﬁcant in that
neither the religious elites nor the government was perceived to have suffered
a loss of authority or legitimacy in participating in the drafting. Yet there
were largely muted reservations to these initiatives. There were concerns
that the government, through the DRH and the SMI, was prescribing how
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Singaporeans should practice their faith, an intrusion into what is essen-
tially a private (and sacred) sphere. Some saw the government securitizing
religion, especially Islam, and imputing to religion negative undertones and
stereotypes. Some Muslims felt that MUIS leaned too heavily on the govern-
ment’s side rather than being the Muslim community’s representative.
In drafting both documents, a broad-based consultation was consciously
undertaken with the policy intent of having both soft law instruments
facilitate civic reasoning and consciousness. There was also the larger process
of encouraging Singaporeans to take ownership in communal and societal
risk management. The policy of informing and involvement is necessary
given Singapore’s emphasis on social cohesion and resilience as a bulwark
against the terrorism threat. An-Na’im (2008: 7) describes civic reason as a
process of reasoning in which the rationale and purpose of public policy or
legislation are open, accessible, and which most citizens can accept or reject.
Nevertheless, while it was sincere and ostensibly extensive, the consultation
process can be faulted for being severely limited to elites or select groups.
Mainstream religious groups represented on the Interreligious Organization
were included while marginal groups were excluded. A salient theme was
that the public consultation should not be characterized by contestation
and that consensus should characterize the process and outcome. This raises
the authenticity consideration: whether the consultation was superﬁcial in scope
and reach and whether it genuinely facilitated a robust exchange of ideas.
To be sure, questions can be raised about the reach of the consultation
and whether the tendency of politically cautious Muslim-Singaporeans to
avoid being critical affected the tenor of feedback gathered. The societal
context is relevant here. The political climate has made the expression of
dissent or even contrarian views somewhat frowned upon. On the other
hand, there is also the overall satisfaction with the way the government
manages religion (Chan 2003). The likelihood of the harmony discourse
privileging the state in a relatively politically stiﬂed society cannot be denied.
Conversely, attitudes and beliefs within segregated communities (such as
those who sympathize with the terrorist cause) being reinforced is high.
Where there is little opportunity for overt dissent and protest, the possibil-
ity of such marginal communities drifting away from the wider community
cannot be understated. Although there was an effort to seek consultation,
the reality of little vigorous public debate surrounding the DRH and, espe-
cially the SMI, can undermine the prospects of inculcating an active com-
mitment of individuals and communities to shared societal values, as well as
the embracing of rights 
 
and
 
 responsibilities in a multireligious society. As
the Muslim-Singaporean community is not homogenous, to seek complete
agreement on values and priorities is an illusion. Thus, the SMI can be
perceived as an interventionist attempt in implementing uniformity within
the Muslim community according to the MUIS’s and the government’s
objectives (see also Charlene Tan 2008). However, policymakers and
bureaucrats alike have to be sensitive and calibrate policy responses that do
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not undermine the delicate internal Islamic balances within the community
by well-intended but inappropriate policy responses.
 
2.
 
Generating Norms and Catalyzing Social Learning
 
While the DRH and SMI can be criticized as hegemonic, statist narratives
and a formulistic compromise between security and religious freedom, they do
have a potential transformative capacity that should not be too easily dismissed.
This potential arises from their promoting the internalization of the values that
are deemed critical to social cohesion and resilience. Because the DRH and
SMI are concerned with interstices of everyday religious identity and practice,
they can however be perceived as a manifestation of creeping authoritarianism
wherein the abiding fear of vulnerability and societal implosion are scaled
up instrumentally to justify uniformity and conformity as a hedge against
disharmony. Indeed, the Singapore approach does not belie the active presence
of the government in maintaining religious harmony. But it is also unique in
seeking to harness both bottom-up initiative and resources, and top-down
technocratic promotion of desired values, norms, and shared experiences.
Given the contested nature of managing the terrorist threat, the acid test
is whether conﬂicting perspectives and responses can be treated as legiti-
mate and useful, and that need not compromise rights, freedom, and liberty.
The policy challenge is to engage the relevant stakeholders and the public
without curbing the informal networks and local resilience that can be usefully
mobilized in the event of a crisis. With the multiplicity of identities, practices,
meanings, and devotion, total agreement of matters of religious dogma and
doctrine even within one faith would be hard to obtain. On the other hand,
the DRH and SMI can provide open channels of interaction and norms of
engagement among the various faith groups in which differences can be
discussed, commonalities appreciated, and tolerance of diversity promoted.
Even as Singapore adopts a calibrated admixture of hard and soft law, the
key challenge is to ensure that the laws generate norms and behavior that become
self-enforcing and provide the sociopolitical substratum for improving ethnic
relations. Self-enforcing norms and behavior refer to the state of affairs in
which the laws, when prudently applied, acquire legitimacy and increasingly
become inviolable. As nonbinding legal instruments, the DRH and SMI allow
a penumbra of ﬂexible interpretation and room for negotiation. In a sense,
the boundaries of this inherent ﬂexibility are imposed by the norms and values
embedded in both documents. This drive to entrench a shared commitment to
religious harmony provides the foundation for the common rules of engagement.
These soft law mechanisms help concretize the norms in the religious land-
scape. Accordingly, the discursive power of soft law facilitates the socialization
of Singaporeans in imbibing the desired values and norms, and helps generate
trust that can be more sustainable than a plethora of legislation.
It would be politically challenging, if not politically questionable, for the
government to formally entrench the content of the DRH and SMI as hard
 372
 
LAW & POLICY July 2009
 
© 2009 The Author
Journal compilation © 2009 Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy
 
law even if they ostensibly regulate conduct and promote the strategic and
normative goal of stable ethnic relations. Keeping them as soft law is a cal-
ibrated measure to combine reﬂexive self-regulation on the part of religious
communities and light-touch regulation on the part of government. Such an
approach would facilitate the transmission of enhanced knowledge and
responsive awareness of the out-of-bounds markers. They also promote
constitutive processes such as persuasion, learning, cooperation, and social-
ization, while also providing some assurance that the state is not attempting
to strait-jacket religion, or worse, to regulate religious doctrine. The DRH
and SMI are hedges against mistrust between and within communities, and
between the faith communities and the government.
 
3.
 
Soft Law’s Credibility and Legitimacy: Of Trust and Surveillance
 
Law provides not only the procedure and structure for social order and
cooperation but also the substratum for the emergence of trust (Knight
2001). In turn, this provides the foundation for successful norm diffusion,
socialization, and learning. Uslaner’s (2002) notion of “generalized trust”—
wherein there is trust of people who are different and whom we do not
know—incorporating a sense of shared fate is a useful trope to appreciate
the value of shared norms and values. As Uslaner (2002) notes, generalized
trust is about bridge-building to people who are different from us and
provides a basis for tolerance and cooperation. In a generalized trust environ-
ment, the preference is for common ground over confrontation. What is
not so well appreciated is that deliberation, the process of seeking common
ground, also functions as a coping mechanism in dealing with uncertainty
by advocating dialogue, compromise, and consensus.
Nevertheless, it is also pertinent to consider whether soft law instruments
can also be tapped upon as quasi-surveillance mechanisms, by alerting the
authorities when the behavior of an individual or a group does not conform
to the norm or prescribed code of conduct, signaling a potential danger.
Given that suicide terrorists are unlikely to be deterred by coercive hard
law or by “persuasive” soft law viz DRH and SMI, the operational utility
of soft law for law enforcement agencies lies in the likelihood that those
who have imbibed the values and norms will be more likely than not to
whistle-blow on or restrain such people who engage in activities that can
undermine societal harmony.
 
20
 
 Thus, the Malay-Muslim community is expected
to take the lead in community policing to counter the ideological traction
of extremism and the gloriﬁed use of violence, especially the “online DIY
extremism” variant that is more insidious, which is difﬁcult to survey and
detect by the authorities.
While the soft law approach can be perceived by some as creeping securiti-
zation of religious identities and practices, especially Islam, that concern has
to be balanced against the reality that the DRH and SMI are not speciﬁcally
designed as covert or overt covers of surveillance and law enforcement. There
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are no reporting requirements. Instead, they are didactic and hortatory in
aspiration, and operate as a creed of shared meaning that arguably needs to
be organically imbibed in response to the challenges of maintaining social
cohesion. The legislative framework discussed earlier provides the government
and its agencies with adequate means of surveillance and law enforcement.
One should not mistake the penchant for top-down high coordination in
Singapore as surveillance. The government appreciates the importance of
DRH and SMI having resonance with and buy-in from the masses. Further,
the government is also acutely concerned with its and the MUIS’s standing
and credibility with the Muslim community. Coupled with a relatively high
level of trust in the government, the obsessive concern with these soft law
mechanisms acquiring legitimacy, efﬁcacy, and efﬁciency helps restrain the
likelihood of their instrumental use by the government.
Further, by privileging moderation and cooperation as well as bench-
marking and compliance, the DRH and SMI can co-opt civil society to be
the trip wire against radicals and terrorists. As de facto standard-setting
and norm-engendering mechanisms, soft law instruments can help the ordinary
citizens internalize the virtues of moderation and coexistence while also
maintaining a watchful eye on potential deviants. Thus, it becomes more
important that the government continues to ensure that the DRH and SMI
acquire deeper resonance among Singaporeans and to avoid cynicism creeping
in that they aid the security agencies’ surveillance of the religious sphere. It
would be extremely foolish of the government to use soft law approaches as
subterfuges for surveillance. The need to maintain the credibility and legiti-
macy of both documents necessitate that the doors be kept open to future
consultations, debate, and negotiated understanding as and when circum-
stances change. This also helps maintain the ideological consent for har-
mony and consensus. In many respects, while the DRH and SMI have a
potential securitizing effect, they also represent putative empowerment in
which the various stakeholders can play an active part in forging resilience.
The mass media continues to be utilized heavily to publicize and inform the
DRH and SMI.21
Both hard and soft law approaches seek to weaken terrorism’s appeal
and currency. Hard law represents the coercive dimension while soft law’s
signaling function point to the relevance and appeal of sociopolitical values.
The DRH and SMI speak of a normative, desired state of society under-
girded by a principled motivation of establishing what is considered right,
appropriate, and ﬁtting (recht or droit) in a socially persuasive and politi-
cally legitimate way. In this way, social control and social order can be
maintained and enhanced. There is now better appreciation of the soft law
approach to engage Singaporeans on the merits of building interethnic
bonds and understanding to counter mutual suspicion and doubt. The soft
law approach is complementary and helps to make up for the inherent limi-
tations of hard law. Hard law is prescriptive and puts in place minimum
standards for compliance. The force of hard law lies in its deterrent power
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for those motivated by a self-absorbed avoidance of punishment. However,
radicals and terrorists are not deterred by such methods.
On the other hand, being preemptive in approach, soft law instruments
such as codes of conduct and best practices, if properly internalized,
encourage and facilitate compliance. While the aspiration is to go beyond
compliance, soft law is seen as being more effective and efﬁcient in peace-time
conditions since it urges principle-based conduct. This norm is more likely
to have greater traction and be sustainable through its calibrated response.
This ensures that the policy response does not marginalize or radicalize
target communities while also engendering the cooperative mindset that
contributes to societal cohesion and resilience. True, soft law does not
speciﬁcally deter terrorists from their objectives, but it does constrain the
terrorists’ ability to harm society indirectly. In many respects, the successful
use of soft law is a conscious attempt to increase the “harmony quotient”
of Singaporeans. The overall deterrent effect of soft law derives from its
facilitating the development of the citizenry’s affective, emotional, and
cognitive abilities to deal with the myriad of complex issues and emotions
that ethnic markers inﬂected by terrorism can arouse.22
In an ever-advancing security state, the initial focus on the terrorism
threat and its immutable links with the Muslim community blinded policy-
makers and citizenry alike to the complexities of terrorism. It contributed
to a ratcheting up of the ambient doubt and an atmosphere of fear. In such
a climate, it is perhaps not surprising that any new policy or initiative was
perceived as a covert instrument of surveillance or tacit support for the
statist imperative of resilience, harmony, and security. The danger of taking
terrorism, even home-grown varieties, from their contexts is that it induces
tunnel vision, lazy analysis, and convenient policy responses that ignore the
centrality of a collective and nuanced response to the threat. The existential
threat to Singapore is not terrorism per se but the mindless knee-jerk
reactions to it. Ultimately, conﬁdence-building is needed to ensure that
Singapore builds its stock of adequate social capital and resilience to
withstand threats to its social fabric posed by terrorist acts.
V. CONCLUSION
In an age where religious extremism is a real national security concern,
public policy and legislation in a multireligious society have to strive to
reﬂect the value and belief systems of citizens, including religious ones. This
embracing of religious values has to be inclusive, and no particular set of
religious beliefs is discriminated or preferred. For the state to remain neutral
and secular in a multireligious polity, the state must paradoxically regulate the
religious realm as a mediator and adjudicator in the sociopolitical arena. As the
end goal of terrorists is to inﬂict terror and division on a community, a society’s
resilience and cohesion is vital. Military warfare and coercive legislation
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and enforcement are grossly inadequate in winning the hearts and minds of
a community. Indeed, a muscular and militaristic approach to counter terrorism
may well play into the terrorists’ binary strategy of “us versus them.”
As complements (but not substitutes) of hard law, the DRH and SMI do
not consciously set out to prescribe rigid conformity through acceptable
practices. Both soft law instruments reinforce the policy imperative that the
growth of the common space need not be at the expense of one’s religious
identity and society’s religious diversity. Crucial to the success of these
efforts in winning the hearts and minds of Singaporeans is whether the
practices and attitudes they encourage will inculcate a strong sense of the
overarching common values and interests, which in time may evolve into
accepted norms. These values and norms can be a sustainable pathway
toward uniting Singaporeans around a common purpose as it seeks to
protect itself against the threat of social implosion by ensuring that the
terrorist threat is not distorted by a moral panic and societal fear. It is an
endeavor toward ensuring that terrorism does not produce an asymmetrical
reaction within the Singaporean heartland. It recognizes the need for the
government to work with and through the communities. Ground-up initiatives
are therefore central. The ultimate objective of Singapore’s counterterrorism
efforts is to create a safe, cohesive, and resilient society through imbibing
Singaporeans with a sense of belonging, understanding, and appreciation of
conationals of other races, religions, and languages.
The DRH and SMI are efforts toward the engagement and metanarrative
of the common values and agreed norms, a helpful corrective to the previous
overindulgent focus on what divides Singaporeans. It is still too premature
to pass a verdict on the effectiveness of the soft law approaches. If the soft
law approach fails, resort can be made to hard law. Nevertheless, policy-
makers would do well to note that the soft law approaches can have a protec-
tive function like hard law and aid in the objective of reducing a society’s
vulnerabilities. This can also result in less need to instill continual fear of
terrorism, which inevitably strains the social fabric as well. Going forward,
the mix of hard and soft law approaches in managing the terrorism threat pro-
vides a good combination of regulation, enforcement, and a basis for the
inculcation of self-enforcing values and norms.
eugene k. b. tan is Assistant Professor of Law at the School of Law, Singapore
Management University. His research interests include the mutual interaction of law
and public policy, ethnic conﬂict regulation, governance, and public ethics.
NOTES
1. Singapore’s resident 4.8 million population comprises Buddhists (42.5 percent),
Muslims (14.9 percent), no religion (14.8 percent), Christians (14.6 percent),
Taoists (8.5 percent), and Hindus (4.0 percent).
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2. While the approach was ostensibly “hard law” emphasizing adherence to school
regulations, the government also attempted to contextualize the policy rationale. The
Education Ministry explained that school uniforms reduced exclusiveness and
promoted integration by sidelining differentiation on the basis of race, religion, or class.
3. See “Singapore Muslim Organizations Decry Terrorism in Name of Islam: Oct.
9 Statement Urges Singaporeans to Unite Against Terrorism.” Available at
http://www.america.gov/st/washﬁle-english/2002/October/20021011151324larocque
@pd.state.gov0.9141504.html.
4. See Donohue (2008) for the costs of counterterrorism laws in the United Kingdom
and the United States.
5. I am grateful to Lord Leonard Hoffman for urging me to clarify this distinction.
6. Chan Hiang Leng Colin v Public Prosecutor (1994 at 683).
7. Societies Act (Cap. 311). The Jehovah Witnesses and the Holy Spirit Association
for the Uniﬁcation of World Christianity (Uniﬁcation Church) are religious
organizations that have been deregistered.
8. Chan Hiang Leng Colin v Public Prosecutor (1994 at 688).
9. The current security concerns with terrorism have provided the ISA with a new
lease of life. The ISA’s predecessor was originally enacted to deal with the com-
munist insurgency in Malaya (1948–60) after the Second World War.
10. On concerns with the ISA, see Singapore Ministry of Law’s response of 9 April
2008 to the International Bar Association Human Rights Institute’s draft report,
“Singapore: Rule of Law Issues of Concern.” Available at http://notesapp.internet.
gov.sg/__48256DF20015A167.nsf/LookupContentDocsByKey/GOVI-7GDEGF?
OpenDocument (accessed 12 August 2008).
11. Public Prosecutor v Benjamin Koh Song Huat (2005); Public Prosecutor v Lim
Yew Nicholas (2005); and Public Prosecutor v Gan Huai Shi (2005).
12. Author’s e-mail correspondence with the Ministry of Home Affairs, 22
November 2005. The government came close to issuing ROs on several occa-
sions. Two Christian and two Muslim religious leaders were summoned and
warned by the authorities to stop “mixing religion with politics and putting
down other faiths.”
13. See the CEP’s “Singapore United” portal, at http://www.singaporeunited.sg. For
a description of the initiatives undertaken to protect Singapore against terrorism,
see NSCS (2004, 2006). On the challenges of engaging Muslims in the United
Kingdom and Australia, see Spalek and Imtoual (2007).
14. The representatives come from the following faiths: Baha’i, Buddhism, Christianity,
Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, Judaism, Sikhism, Taoism, and Zoroastrianism.
15. Secularism is understood here as the ideology of separating religion and state,
and of the state being neutral vis-à-vis the various religious faiths and between
religion and nonreligion.
16. The Islamic Religious Council (MUIS) is a statutory board tasked with regulating
Muslim religious affairs and to advise the government in matters relating to Islam.
See Article 153 of the Singapore Constitution read with the Administration of
Muslim Law Act (Cap. 3).
17. But see the longitudinal national Survey on Social Attitudes of Singaporeans,
which has indicated that Muslim-Singaporeans are “moderate” in their religious
views and practice of their faith.
18. In discussing multiculturalism as a necessity and a constitutionally entrenched
obligation, the chief justice also supports the moderation discourse: “The recom-
mended solution is not to outcast it [fundamentalist Islam], but to moderate it”
(Chan 2007).
19. This MUIS sermon was titled “Forging the Singapore Muslim Identity.”
20. Or as a reviewer put it starkly, “In other words, soft law approaches help the
state persuade religious people who aren’t radical and terrorists to keep an eye
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on those who are.” I thank the reviewer for so doggedly engaging me on this
point. I also thank Tham Chee Ho for our discussion, which has helped me clarify
my thinking.
21. But see George (2008) on the importance of alternative discourses to the dominant
one of order.
22. A government media campaign in 2007 sought to reinforce the notion that
Singapore’s security and unity is a “shared mission for all.” The tender notice
(on ﬁle with author) stated that the advertising campaign should aim to
“inﬂuence public perceptions at the broad ideological and psychological level,
providing an emotive context to an understanding of Singapore’s security
environment.”
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